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A B S T R A C T
Committees of national officials play a major role in the
decision-making of the European Union’s main legislative
body, the Council of Ministers. The study investigates the
conditions under which bureaucrats decide on legislative
dossiers without direct involvement of ministers. A statisti-
cal analysis is performed to examine this question, using an
original data set of 439 legislative proposals. The results of
the analysis indicate that formal institutional features such
as the voting rule in the Council and the involvement of the
European Parliament affect committee decision-making,
whereas no effects of committee socialization and prefer-
ence divergence among member states are identified. The
results diminish concerns about the democratic legitimacy
of Council decision-making to some extent, as the findings
demonstrate that bureaucrats tend to decide only the less
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Council committees as law-makers
Many legislative decisions made in the European Union (EU) are not decided
or even discussed by ministers in the Council. Although precise estimates
vary, it is clear that a majority of legal acts are de facto adopted by bureau-
crats in the various working groups and committees of the Council without
any direct involvement of ministers (Häge, 2006; Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace, 2006: 53; Van Schendelen, 1996). The study examines the conditions
under which legislative decisions are made by committees. By studying the
explanatory power of different theoretical perspectives, the paper sheds light
on the characteristics of Council committee negotiations. What kind of issues
do committees decide? Do committees deal only with technical matters, as
many practitioners and observers contend (Fouilleux et al., 2005; Spence,
2004)? Are committee members just stand-in negotiators for their ministers
or do they have leeway to pursue their own goals? Does political conflict
among committee members’ principals or between the Council and other
institutions affect the committee’s decision-making capacity? Do national
officials become socialized through their interaction in Council committees
and take on more supranational attitudes that facilitate negotiations (Lewis,
1998, 2005)?
These kinds of question have largely been neglected in previous studies.
Most theoretical and empirical research on legislative decision-making in the
EU treats member states as unitary actors. Despite bureaucrats’ important
function in keeping the Council machinery running, their role in Council
committees has hardly been examined.1 The current study contributes to
filling this gap in the literature by investigating the factors that influence
committee decision-making through a systematic quantitative analysis. The
analysis relies on a novel data set that combines information on proposal
characteristics, government party positions and features of the decision-
making process for 439 legislative dossiers introduced by the Commission
between 1 July 2000 and 1 January 2004.
The paper is structured as follows. First, the existing literature related to
the research question is reviewed. The second section describes the role of
committees in the decision-making process of the Council. This description
is followed by a discussion of what counts as a committee decision for the
purpose of this study. The subsequent theoretical section discusses potential
explanatory factors for committee decision-making and derives testable
hypotheses. The next two sections describe the research design and present
the results of the statistical analysis. The paper concludes with a summary of
the findings.
European Union Politics 8(3)3 0 0
Literature review
Several strands of existing research on EU policy-making are related to the
research question. First, a growing body of empirical work examines the
conflict structure underlying Council negotiations. Beyers and Dierickx (1997,
1998), Elgström et al. (2001), Kaeding and Selck (2005), Mattila and Lane
(2001), Selck (2005), Thomson et al. (2004) and Zimmer et al. (2005) find
evidence for a division between Northern and Southern member states. In
contrast, Hagemann (2005) and Mattila (2004) identify the left–right ideology
of governments as one of the main dimensions of contestation in the Council.
Yet other studies find no recurrent coalition patterns at all but point instead
to issue-specific and member-state-specific reasons for disagreement (Hayes-
Renshaw et al., 2006; see also Thomson et al., 2004; Zimmer et al., 2005).
A second strand of research employs formal models to shed light on
decision-making in the Council and in the EU in general. Policy positions or
preferences of actors are common explanatory factors in all of these models.
Procedural models also consider formal institutional features of the decision-
making process to be of relevance (e.g. Crombez, 1996, 1997; Steunenberg,
1994; Tsebelis, 1994). In contrast, bargaining models stress the power
resources of actors and the importance actors attach to an issue (e.g. Arregui
et al., 2006). Empirical tests of these models indicate that bargaining models
perform relatively better than procedural models in predicting the outcome
of EU decision-making processes (Schneider et al., 2006).2
A third strand of research focuses on macro characteristics of Council
decision-making processes, such as the efficiency of decision-making and the
extent of policy change. Studies on decision-making efficiency focus primarily
on the impact of institutional rules on Council negotiations. Both the studies
by Golub (1999) and Schulz and König (2000) find that the possibility of
adopting legislation by qualified majority voting increases the speed with
which a decision is made in the Council. However, a recent study by Drüner
et al. (2006) identifies the level of political conflict rather than the formal
voting rule to be an important factor influencing decision-making efficiency.
The same study also finds a substantial impact of political conflict on the
extent of policy change accepted in the Council.
A fourth thread of work examines issues of delegation and discretion in
the EU (Franchino, 2005; Pollack, 1997). A common argument in these studies
is that less-informed politicians delegate decision-making authority to
bureaucrats to benefit from the bureaucrats’ higher level of expertise. The
results of several empirical studies (Franchino, 2000, 2004) support the thesis
that the extent of discretion granted to bureaucrats in charge of policy imple-
mentation increases with the degree of preference convergence between
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bureaucrats and politicians and with the uncertainty surrounding the practi-
cal consequences of legal provisions. A similar logic underlies the infor-
mational theory of legislative organization (Krehbiel, 1992). According to this
theory, parliamentary committees are established by the full plenary to take
advantage of the expertise acquired by the specialized committee members.
How much discretion the plenary is willing to grant to the committee depends
on the degree of uncertainty and the extent of preference convergence of the
two bodies. In the EU context, hypotheses based on the informational theory
of legislative organization are supported by studies of European Parliament
(EP) committees and their members (Kaeding, 2004; McElroy, 2006).
Finally, another body of literature investigates the role perceptions of
bureaucrats representing member states in meetings of Council committees.
The results of these studies support the notion that committee members hold
supranational role perceptions that complement their identities as government
representatives (e.g. Egeberg et al., 2003). The findings in Egeberg (1999) and
Trondal (2001, 2002) also support the view that supranational role perceptions
are the result of socialization that occurs through interaction in committees at
the European level. However, the studies by Beyers (1998, 2005) indicate that
national factors play a more prominent role in shaping the attitudes of officials
towards the EU than social interaction at the European level.
The discussed literature points to factors that might also be of relevance
for explaining committee decision-making. First, the work on the Council’s
conflict structure and on formal models of Council decision-making directs
attention to the importance of policy preferences and political conflict.
Secondly, procedural models as well as the studies on decision-making
efficiency and policy change point to the potential effects on committee
decision-making of formal institutional features of the legislative process.
Thirdly, the delegation literature indicates that policy uncertainty and the
associated discretion might be factors explaining committee decision-making.
Finally, the work on supranational role perceptions suggests that the be-
haviour of bureaucrats might be affected by the consequences of socialization
in Council committees. The theory section discusses the causal mechanisms
underlying these factors in more detail. The next two sections, respectively,
describe the role of committees in the legislative decision-making of the
Council and discuss the issues involved in measuring the level at which a
decision is reached in the Council.
The role of committees in Council decision-making
What is generically referred to as ‘the Council’ is in reality a hierarchically and
horizontally divided organization. Horizontally, the Council is divided into
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nine formations according to different policy areas. Hierarchically, the Council
consists of three basic levels: the working parties at the bottom, the Committee
of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) in the middle and the different for-
mations of ministers at the top. Each of these levels is involved in the decision-
making process of the Council.
After the Commission transmits a proposal to the Council, the proposal
is first considered by the relevant working party. Officially, about 160 of these
specialized groups exist.3 The membership of working parties is composed of
government representatives, who are attached either to the permanent repre-
sentations in Brussels or to national ministries or agencies. As a general rule,
representatives of the member state holding the rotating Council Presidency
chair the meetings of working parties. The Commission is also represented in
working parties in order to introduce, explain and defend its proposal. All
working party members are experts in a certain policy field, but the coverage
of topics varies widely among groups, ranging from only 2 groups handling
all matters pertaining to environmental policy to about 25 groups dealing with
specific aspects of agricultural policy. A proposal is often discussed during
several meetings of a working party. If all issues can be resolved by the
working party, bodies at higher levels of the Council do not discuss the dossier
any further. In this case, the dossier forms an A-point on the agenda of a forth-
coming ministerial meeting. These A-points are not discussed by ministers but
are adopted en bloc at the beginning of the meeting.
If the working party members cannot reach full agreement about the
content of the dossier, the working party’s chair sends the dossier up the
hierarchy to one of the two formations of Coreper. The dossier is usually
accompanied by a report describing the progress of negotiations and out-
lining the remaining problematic points. The permanent representatives
themselves meet in Coreper II, which deals with proposals in the more ‘politi-
cal’ policy fields such as General Affairs and External Relations (GAER),
Justice and Home Affairs, and Economic and Financial Affairs. The deputies
of the permanent representatives meet in Coreper I, which handles the
dossiers in the remaining, more ‘technical’ policy areas. If Coreper can resolve
the outstanding issues, the dossier is again adopted by ministers as an 
A-point without discussion. The dossier becomes a B-point on the agenda to
be discussed by ministers only when both the working party and Coreper fail
to reach complete agreement.
The preceding description is a rather stylized account of decision-making
in the Council. In reality, a proposal can repeatedly travel up and down one
or several layers of the Council hierarchy before a final decision is reached.
In addition, the legislative process might not end after the first Council
decision when the co-decision procedure applies. The internal decision-
making process of the Council may repeat itself when the Council’s common
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position has to be reconsidered in the light of new amendments made by the
EP in the second reading of the co-decision procedure.
What counts as a committee decision?
The above discussion indicates that the identification of the decision-making
level in the Council is not a trivial task and warrants some discussion. The
study examines only first-reading decisions of the Council to assure a homo-
geneous sample of cases. In cases where the consultation procedure applies,
the EP can give only a non-binding opinion and the Council’s first-reading
decision coincides with the adoption or rejection of the proposal. In contrast,
the co-decision procedure grants far-reaching amendment and veto rights to
the EP and allows for up to three readings of the proposal by both institutions.
The Council can adopt a proposal in its first reading only if it accepts all of
the EP’s first-reading amendments. Otherwise, the Council’s first-reading
decision corresponds to a rejection of the proposal or, most commonly, to the
adoption of a so-called ‘common position’. The Council’s common position
then forms the basis of the EP’s deliberations in the second reading. The study
focuses on first-reading decisions of the Council because the legislative
process after the first reading is mainly about resolving the conflict between
the Council as a whole and the EP, not about reaching an agreement within
the Council. The view that the Council’s main decision is made in the first
reading is also reflected in the fact that co-decision dossiers are almost exclus-
ively managed by Coreper and working parties after a common position has
been reached in the Council. Ministers rarely get involved in second-reading
discussions or conciliation committee negotiations (Bostock, 2002).4
Although some of the theoretical arguments presented below apply
primarily to the work of working parties rather than of Coreper, the analysis
neglects the distinction between these two levels and focuses only on the
division between ministers and committees in general. Several reasons justify
this choice. Regarding the democratic legitimacy of Council decision-making,
the distinction between ministers and bureaucrats in general is more relevant
than the division between different layers of committees. Secondly, Coreper
makes only about one-fifth of the Council’s legislative decisions; the remain-
ing proposals are decided either by working parties or by ministers (Häge,
2006). Finally, the bureaucratic level at which a proposal was decided is very
difficult, if not impossible, to identify for a large number of proposals. In
contrast, information on whether or not a proposal was ever discussed by
ministers is relatively easy to obtain in a reliable manner.
Even with a limitation to the divide between the political and bureau-
cratic levels, the identification of the level at which a particular proposal was
European Union Politics 8(3)3 0 4
decided is not straightforward. Given the focus of this study on decisions by
committees, the study opts for the most restrictive measure in this respect.
Only dossiers that showed no direct involvement of ministers were coded as
having been decided by a committee. Proposals that were at some stage
discussed in ministerial meetings were not coded as committee decisions,
even when the dossier was subsequently referred back to the committee with
further instructions and eventually decided by the committee.5 The results of
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Table 1 Decision-making level by Council formation
Council formation Committee Ministers Total
Culture 5 1 6
(83.3) (16.7) (100.0)
Education and Youth 2 7 9
(22.2) (77.8) (100.0)
Agriculture 48 41 89
(53.9) (46.1) (100.0)
Fisheries 20 17 37
(54.0) (46.0) (100.0)
Economic and Finance 32 17 49
(65.3) (34.7) (100.0)
Environment 7 29 36
(19.4) (80.6) (100.0)
Justice and Home Affairs 17 20 37
(46.0) (54.0) (100.0)
Transport and Telecommunications 4 65 69
(5.8) (94.2) (100.0)
Industry and Energy 2 16 18
(11.1) (88.9) (100.0)
Research 2 10 12
(16.7) (83.3) (100.0)
Internal Market, Consumers, Tourism 23 29 52
(44.2) (55.8) (100.0)
Employment and Social Affairs 2 15 17
(11.8) (88.2) (100.0)
Health 0 8 8
(0.00) (100.0) (100.0)
Total 164 275 439
(37.4) (62.6) (100.0)
Note: The numbers in brackets give row percentages. The sample is restricted to legislative
proposals that regulate internal EU policies and were introduced by the Commission between
1 July 2000 and 1 January 2004. See text for the precise sample selection criteria. A proposal was
coded as having been decided at the ministerial level when it had been debated by ministers at
some stage during Council negotiations and as having been decided by a committee otherwise.
Source: Own data based on information from Prelex and Council documents.
this coding procedure can be seen in Table 1. The table shows considerable
variation across Council formations in the number of dossiers decided at a
particular level. Although different Council formations as such do not consti-
tute an explanation of why a proposal is decided at the committee level, the
table illustrates the wide variation in committee decision-making, which calls
for an explanation.
Theoretical perspectives and hypotheses
The literature review pointed to preferences, formal institutions, socialization
and uncertainty as factors that are potentially of relevance for explaining
committee decision-making. This section discusses the theoretical arguments
underlying these factors in more detail. The section also addresses the poten-
tial influence of political salience, a factor that has been largely neglected in
previous research. Testable hypotheses are derived for each of these factors.
The theories underlying the proposed effects of preferences and formal insti-
tutions retain the assumption of member states as unitary actors. In these
theories, agreement reached at the committee level is simply an indicator of
the efficiency of Council decision-making and is not related to specific
characteristics of the committee or its members. In contrast, the perspectives
theorizing effects of socialization, uncertainty and salience assume that
characteristics of Council committees and their members play a significant
role in explaining committee decision-making.
Policy preferences
In most explanations of Council decision-making, policy preferences play an
important role. Schneider et al. (2006) distinguish between procedural models
that stress formal rules for aggregating actors’ preferences (e.g. König and
Pöter, 2001; Selck and Steunenberg, 2004; Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000; for
reviews, see Dowding, 2000; Hörl et al., 2005) and theories that emphasize
informal bargaining processes as important for translating individual prefer-
ences into group decision-making outcomes (e.g. Arregui et al., 2004; Bailer,
2004). In either case, political actors are assumed to care primarily about
policy outcomes, for either ideological or electoral reasons. Because most of
these models assume complete information, they do not yield direct pre-
dictions about the difficulty of reaching an agreement in the Council. A
proposal is either instantly accepted or rejected. However, the expectation that
a larger divergence of preferences among actors makes it harder to reach an
agreement is in line with the general reasoning underlying these models (see
Drüner et al., 2006; Schulz and König, 2000).
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The models consider member states as unitary actors. Implicitly, national
officials negotiating in Council committees are regarded as perfect agents of
their political masters. National officials represent the interests of their minister
and act accordingly. Interactions in committees are supposed to mirror those
at the political level and bureaucrats have no effect on negotiation outcomes
independent of the will of their political superiors. In short, bureaucrats act as
stand-in negotiators for their ministers according to these models. Therefore,
preference divergence among ministers should also have an adverse effect on
the chances that agreement is reached on the committee level:
H1: The less diverse ministers’ policy preferences, the more likely a decision is
reached at the committee level.
Institutions
Both the procedural and the bargaining models take formal institutional
structures into account (Schneider et al., 2006). In the bargaining perspective,
formal institutions shape the setting in which negotiations take place and may
determine the bargaining strength of different actors. However, the mechan-
ism through which decisions are reached remains bargaining. In procedural
models, formal institutions determine not only the relevant actors and their
power resources, but also the aggregation of individual preferences into
collective decisions. The Council’s voting rule is of particular relevance in this
respect (e.g. Crombez, 1996, 1997; Steunenberg, 1994; Tsebelis, 1994; for a
discussion of this point, see Mattila and Lane, 2001). If only a qualified
majority of member states is needed to adopt a measure rather than agree-
ment by all member states, a decision about policy change is reached more
easily in the Council. Given that member states are considered to be unitary
actors, the voting rule should have the same effect on decision-making at the
committee level:
H2a: The lower the voting threshold in the Council, the more likely a decision is
reached at the committee level.
Even if actual voting is mainly restricted to the ministerial level, the mere
possibility of a vote being taken later by ministers should result in more
flexible negotiating positions in committees. When the unanimity rule
applies, each member state knows that no legislation will be adopted without
its approval. A patient member state can simply stick to its initial position,
trying to extract concessions from member states that are more eager to
change policy. When qualified majority voting applies, it might be more
beneficial for member states to influence an early compromise solution found
in committee negotiations than to stick with their original position and risk
eventually being outvoted at the ministerial level.
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The expected voting rule effect is mainly based on the reasoning in
procedural models, but the legislative procedure is also consequential in
bargaining models. The co-decision procedure essentially empowers an
additional player, the European Parliament, with a veto right. Thus, even if
the decision-making mechanism is bargaining rather than voting, the views
of an additional actor have to be taken into account in order to reach an overall
agreement. Although the EP does not take part in Council deliberations
directly, the EP can exert indirect influence on Council negotiation in a
number of ways. First, more and more efforts are made to reach an early
agreement between the Council and the EP in the first reading. In order to
reach an early agreement, at least some of the EP’s views have to be incor-
porated in the Council’s first-reading decision. Even if no attempts are made
to bring the procedure to a close in the first reading, member states might
anticipate that the Council’s first-reading decision constitutes only a pre-
liminary step in shaping the eventual policy outcome. Aware that the
Council’s common position forms only the base for a later compromise with
the EP, member states with positions very distant from those of the Parlia-
ment have reasons to be more reluctant to make concessions. Secondly, the
amendments proposed by the EP might direct attention to latently con-
flictual issues that would not have been considered by member states other-
wise (see e.g. Rittberger, 2000). Finally, the EP’s position might bolster the case
of a member state and give additional legitimacy to the state’s position,
thereby also making it more unwilling to compromise in Council nego-
tiations. Given a greater reluctance of member states to make concessions, an
agreement at the committee level is expected to be less likely:
H2b: The less involvement of the European Parliament, the more likely a decision
is reached at the committee level.
Committee socialization
A growing field of research considers the socializing effects of international
institutions (e.g. Checkel, 2003; Hooghe, 2005; Johnston, 2001). As the litera-
ture review has shown, this field is also one of the few areas where research
has directly focused on Council committees and their members. Several quan-
titative studies have analysed to what extent committee members invoke
supranational role perceptions and how far these role perceptions can be
attributed to interaction in committees (Beyers, 1998, 2005; Egeberg, 1999;
Trondal, 2001, 2002). The general argument is simple: working in EU insti-
tutions exposes people to supranational norms and values and thus makes
them more prone to adopt these views.
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Qualitative studies find that the socialization of committee members also
influences decision-making behaviour (Lewis, 1998, 2005). Bureaucrats’ more
supranational outlook is thought to foster a commitment to joint problem-
solving and to reduce the propensity to pursue individualist state interests.
According to this view, socialization cannot be equated with a simple change
in policy preferences. Socialization occurs at a more general cognitive level.
The result of socialization is not a change in specific policy positions, but a
change in the standards according to which different policy options are
evaluated and a change in the norms perceived to define acceptable be-
haviour in committee negotiations. The most likely result of socialization in
the context of the Council is a valuation of the Council’s decision-making
process itself (Lewis, 2005: 939), rather than a shift in bureaucrats’ specific
policy positions towards more supranational preferences. Thus, socialization
does not necessarily result in more supranational policy outcomes, but it does
induce more cooperative behaviour in negotiators as a result of common
efforts to keep the Council machinery running. More cooperative behaviour
should make agreement in committees more likely. Socialization into supra-
national norms and values works through social interaction in international
settings. Thus, the more time bureaucrats spend in Brussels interacting with
their peers from other countries, the more likely they are to develop and adopt
a dense net of norms and values governing appropriate behaviour in
committee negotiations.
H3: The higher the committee meeting density, the more likely a decision will be
reached at the committee level.
The transfer and adoption of norms and values can occur through a
variety of mechanisms, including normative suasion, social mimicking,
shaming and communication (Hooghe, 2005: 865). However, the more time
individuals spend in international settings, the more likely it is that these
mechanisms are effective in changing the norms and values held by them.
Committee meeting density refers not to the number of committee meetings
at a particular point in time, but to a more structural characteristic of Council
committees. Some of these committees meet on a regular basis several times
per month and deal with all issues falling in a certain policy area (e.g. the
environment committee), whereas others are highly specialized and meet only
when the need arises to discuss a specific proposal (e.g. many working parties
dealing with the common agricultural policy).
Note that the hypothesis is not intended to test possible socializing effects
of other international or domestic organizations that might also lead to
changes in the norms and values held by bureaucrats (see Beyers, 2005;
Hooghe, 2005). Although socialization in other organizations might influence
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the attitudes of bureaucrats taking part in committee negotiations, these
experiences affect individual committee members in different ways. Given
that committee members have relatively unique career histories, socialization
in other organizational settings is not expected to affect committee decision-
making in a systematic manner. Thus, the current analysis examines only the
‘strong socialization hypothesis’ (Beyers, 2005: 901), which asserts that social
interactions in international institutions lead to changes in actor character-
istics. More precisely, the analysis tests whether the interaction in Council
committees leads to changes in the values and norms that bureaucrats hold
and that affect their negotiating behaviour.6
Whereas the socialization approach theorizes why bureaucrats might be
more or less able to reach agreement at the committee level, the remaining
two perspectives take the opposite view and discuss the conditions under
which politicians are willing to delegate decision-making authority to bureau-
crats rather than examine legislative proposals themselves.
Uncertainty
Delegation theories point to uncertainty about the practical consequences of
legal provisions as an important reason for principals to transfer decision-
making authority to better-informed agents (Bendor et al., 2001). For example,
the informational theory of legislative organization argues that parliaments
establish committees and delegate far-reaching decision-making powers to
them in order to reap the policy benefits accruing from the on average more
favourable decisions made owing to the specialized knowledge of committee
members (Krehbiel, 1992: 3–6; for empirical studies in an EU context, see
Kaeding, 2004; McElroy, 2006). The sectorally specialized committee structure
of the Council resembles the structure of parliamentary committees in many
respects. The assumption that members of Council committees are better
informed than ministers about the actual consequences of legislative acts is
also seems reasonable (see also Hoyland, 2006). Considering that committee
members are directly accountable to their ministers, the potential for bureau-
cratic drift is limited in the Council, too. The limited potential for bureaucratic
drift gives ministers enough incentive to delegate decision-making authority
to Council committees in order to exploit their informational advantages. An
important finding of the informational theory of legislative organization, and
of most other delegation theories, is that more decision-making authority will
be delegated in the face of higher uncertainty about policy outcomes. In the
context of the Council, ministers should therefore be more likely to leave a
decision to the committee in cases where a proposal is concerned with regu-
lating issues whose consequences are highly uncertain.
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H4: The more uncertain the practical consequences of legal provisions, the more
likely a decision will be reached at the committee level.
Whereas this approach stresses the informational advantages of bureaucrats
in making policy decisions, the last perspective emphasizes the limitations of
ministers in terms of time and resources.
Salience
Besides the lack of expertise, politicians’ organizational and natural resource
constraints might also be reasons for delegation. Law-makers have only a
certain amount of time available that they can devote to scrutinizing and
discussing legislation (Cox, 2006: 142). Even where information about policy
outcomes is complete, drafting legislation takes time and effort that cannot
be spent on other purposes (Huber and Shipan, 2002: 79). Uncertainty about
the preferences of other legislators, rather than about the policy outcome,
might also be of importance here. The very process of decision-making, that
is, building coalitions and reaching agreements, becomes rather costly in such
circumstances (Cox and McCubbins, 2006: 306). Extending the size of the
legislature is also not an option, at least not in the short run (Epstein 
and O’Halloran, 1999: 44). Therefore, legislators are expected to prioritize.
Ministers are likely to focus their attention on the dossiers that promise them
the highest benefits in terms of re-election chances and to delegate decision-
making authority for other dossiers (Epstein and O’Halloran, 1999: 47;
Franchino, 2004). The perceived importance of a dossier is usually connected
to its expected consequences for core constituencies, powerful organized
interests or the public at large. Thus, ministers should be more likely to take
up politically salient proposals that have a larger effect on the ministers’
chances of being re-elected. Conversely, committees should have more leeway
to reach an agreement when the issue is less important.
H5: The lower the salience of a legislative dossier, the more likely a decision will
be reached at the committee level.
Data collection, case selection and operationalization
The empirical part of the study consists of a statistical analysis of the decision-
making level in the Council. The analysis is based on a sample of 439 legis-
lative dossiers. The dossiers are selected according to several criteria. First,
only proposals transmitted to the Council and the Parliament between 1 July
2000 and 1 January 2004 are considered. The focus on recent years ensures
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that the information necessary to conduct the analysis is publicly available.
As the observation period ends on 1 January 2005, the selection procedure
allows the fate of a proposal to be followed for at least one year after its intro-
duction by the Commission. The problem of censored observations is thereby
reduced. Second, only proposals to be decided according to the co-decision
or consultation procedure are included in the sample. These two procedures
are currently the most widely used procedures to regulate decision-making
on substantial policy initiatives. The two selection criteria resulted in an initial
sample of 809 cases.
Proposals that were withdrawn by the Commission (26 proposals) and
proposals on which no Council decision had been made by 1 January 2005
(96 proposals) were then excluded from the analysis. None of the proposals
that were withdrawn by the Commission had ever been discussed at the
ministerial level. Thus, committees seem to play an important role in that they
screen proposals and establish whether the proposed policy change is accept-
able to the Council in principle. However, a rather different logic of committee
decision-making is likely to apply to cases in which the conflict is about the
acceptability of any policy change rather than the precise form of the policy
change. The theoretical perspectives and hypotheses outlined earlier refer to
the Council level at which a decision is made, not to whether or not such a
decision is made at all. The loss of the censored cases is unfortunate but
unavoidable, given that information for the dependent variable is missing.
The remaining selection criteria are employed to yield a homogeneous
sample of legislative dossiers that regulate the substance of internal EU
policies. Therefore, the conclusion of international agreements (76 proposals)
and proposals discussed by the Development (10 proposals) and GAER
Council formations (15 proposals in external relations and 44 in general
affairs) were discarded. Concluding international agreements is usually a
pure formality and these acts are routinely handled at the committee level.
The external relations part of GAER hardly deals with internal EU policies.
The general affairs part of GAER is mostly concerned with administrative
and institutional issues, not with substantive matters of policy. For the same
reason, proposals discussed in the Budget Council formation (10 proposals)
are excluded. Finally, all dossiers considered by the Council to be of a non-
legislative nature (58 proposals) or introduced by a member state rather than
the Commission (35 proposals) were dropped from the sample. Overall, this
selection procedure resulted in a final sample of 439 cases used in the
analysis.
The dependent variable is measured through a dichotomous variable
indicating whether or not the proposal had been decided at the committee
level. The coding of the dependent variable employed the criteria discussed
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earlier. Information to generate this variable was extracted from Prelex, the
Commission’s database monitoring the decision-making process between EU
institutions.7 Data on the applicable legislative procedure and actual EP
involvement are also extracted from this source. The indicator for EP involve-
ment is a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the EP made any
amendments under the co-decision procedure. Thus, the variable not only
measures the formal powers of the EP under the co-decision procedure, but
also takes into account whether the EP actually made use of these powers.
Information on the voting rule was collected from the ‘Monthly Summary of
Council Acts’ published by the Council. Where such information was not
available, the voting rule was identified through the legal base of the proposal
in conjunction with the appendix in Hix (2005), which lists the applicable
voting rule and legislative procedure corresponding to the different articles
of the EU treaties.
The preference divergence variable is based on data on the party compo-
sition of government cabinets and the parties’ positions on different policy
issues. The party position data were taken from the Chapel Hill 2002 expert
survey (Hooghe et al., 2005). In contrast to other party position data sets 
(e.g. Benoit and Laver, 2006; Klingemann et al., 2006), the Chapel Hill indi-
cators are specifically constructed to provide party positions on EU policy
issues. Information on cabinet composition in the member state governments
was collected from various editions of the Political Data Yearbook of the
European Journal of Political Research. The party affiliation of government
ministers and the corresponding policy positions were then linked to the
different Council formations. As can be seen in Table 2, the correspondence
between formations and policy positions is not one-to-one. Policy-specific
party positions are available only for the main EU policy areas. Therefore,
party positions on the internal market are also used as proxies for the
positions on Transport and Telecommunications as well as Industry and
Energy. Similarly, party positions on the social left–right dimension should
be closely related to positions on Education and Youth as well as Culture.
In cases where several ministers of one government occupied portfolios
that could all be related to one Council formation, the average party position
of these ministers was used as the country’s position. Otherwise, the
minister’s party position represented the country’s position. For each Council
formation, the preference divergence variable was calculated as the maximum
difference between the countries’ policy positions.8 Although party positions
are constant, the measure varies both between and within Council formations.
In part, this variation is owing to the different positions on different policy
issues. However, much of the variation also stems from changes in the compo-
sition of government cabinets over time.
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The degree of exposure to supranational norms and values in committees
is measured by the average number of days a committee met per month
between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2004. Information on the number
of committee meetings was derived from the calendar of Council meetings
maintained by the Council secretariat. To reflect the structural differences
among committees rather than short-term fluctuations in their workload, the
number of meetings is averaged over the whole time period rather than over
months or over presidency periods.
A variable indicating whether or not the proposal provides for the
establishment of a Comitology committee is used as a measure of the un-
certainty surrounding the practical consequences of a dossier (see also
Franchino, 2004). Comitology committees not only assist and advise but also
control the Commission in implementing EU legislation. Previous research
argues that the need for post hoc control of implementation tasks is stronger
when legislators have diverse preferences (Franchino, 2000). Thus, the estab-
lishment of a Comitology committee could be an indicator either of the
complexity of the policy matter or of political conflict among legislators.
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Table 2 The linkage of Council formations with party policy positions





Economic and Finance Internal market
Environment Environmental policy
Justice and Home Affairs Common policy on asylum
Transport and Telecommunications Internal market
Industry and Energy
Research Internal market
Internal Market, Consumers, Tourism
Employment and Social Affairs Employment policy
Health
Note: The Council formations are based on the organization of the Council as of June 2000,
excluding General Affairs and External Relations, Budget and Development (see text for further
details). Data on the party positions on the policy dimensions are taken from the Chapel Hill 2002
expert survey (Hooghe et al., 2005).
However, any possible effect of political conflict is controlled for in the statisti-
cal analysis through the inclusion of the preference divergence variable.
Nevertheless, the analysis is repeated with an alternative uncertainty variable.
This variable indicates whether the proposal has implications for one or
several policy areas. The variable is based on the number of policy fields
mentioned in the Prelex database. Anticipating the consequences of legal
provisions that affect several policy areas should be more difficult than antici-
pating the consequences of legal provisions that affect only one policy area.
The salience of a dossier is assessed through the number of recitals
contained in the proposal. Recitals outline and list the reasons for adopting a
certain dossier. This measure is based on the assumption that the importance
of a piece of legislation varies with the number of reasons given for its
adoption. The more important a dossier, the larger the number of justifications
given for its adoption. Actors are likely to value policy issues in different
degrees, since they are more or less affected by decisions in different policy
areas. Considering that the Commission drafts the initial proposal, the salience
variable could be biased somewhat towards representing the valuations of this
institution. However, given that the Commission is generally regarded as the
promoter of European integration and the common European interest, the
measure should give a good approximation of the importance of a proposal
in the overall European legal order even if such an effect exists. Table 3
describes all the variables and their sources.
Results of the statistical analysis
A logistic regression is performed to examine the relationships between the
independent variables and the Council decision-making level. The results of
the analysis are presented in Table 4. A positive relationship in Table 4 indi-
cates that higher values of the independent variable increase the likelihood
that a decision will be made by a committee rather than by ministers. Models
1 and 2 show specifications based on the theoretical considerations discussed
above. Models 3 and 4 add dummy variables to control for any unaccounted
effects specific to policy-making in certain council formations.
The preference divergence variable does not show a statistically signifi-
cant effect in any of the models. Political conflict among member states does
not seem to influence the level at which a decision is taken in the Council. In
contrast, the variable for EP involvement shows a rather strong and clear
relationship in the expected direction. EP amendments under the co-decision
procedure make a decision at the committee level less likely. The results
regarding the voting rule variable are somewhat ambiguous. Although the
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Table 3 Description of variables and data sources
Name Description Sources
Committee Dichotomous variable: Prelexa and Council documentsb
decision- 0 = discussed by ministers
making 1 = never discussed by 
ministers
Preference Distance between most Cabinets: Political Data 
divergence extreme policy positions Yearbook, European Journal of 
of ministers’ parties Political Research, 1999–2005;
Policy positions: Hooghe et al.
(2005)
Qualified Dichotomous variable: Monthly Summary of Council 
majority voting 0 = unanimity Actsc; appendix in Hix (2005: 
1 = qualified majority voting 415)
EP involvement Dichotomous variable: Prelex
0 = consultation or no 
amendment under co-decision
1 = co-decision and amendment
Committee Average number of meeting Calendars of working party 
meeting density days per month between meetings maintained by the 
1 January 2000 and Council Secretariatd, Council 
31 December 2004 documents
Comitology Dichotomous variable: Commission proposals
committee 0 = no provision for committee
1 = provision for committee
Policy areas Dichotomous variable: Prelex
0 = one policy area
1 = more than one policy area
Salience Number of recitals Commission proposals
a See the Prelex website: http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en (consulted 22 August
2006).
b See the Council’s public register of documents:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.asp?id=254&lang=en&mode=g (consulted 
28 February 2007).
c See the ‘Monthly Summary of Council Acts’ on the Council’s website:
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/showPage.ASP?id=551&lang=en&mode=g
(consulted 10 August 2006).
d The calendars were obtained through a request for access to Council documents; see
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_applications/showPage.asp?id=306&lang=en&mode=g
(consulted 22 February 2007).
coefficient of the voting rule variable shows the expected sign in all models,
the relationship is only statistically significant in the models including the
dummy variables for different Council formations.
The committee socialization hypothesis is not supported by the data
analysis. The coefficient of the socialization variable indicates a statistically
significant negative relationship in the models excluding Council formation
controls. This finding is clearly contrary to expectations. Although the
coefficient changes its sign when dummy variables for Council formations
are introduced, the relationship is not statistically significant. In contrast,
uncertainty about the practical consequences of a proposal seems to have the
expected effect on committee decision-making. Models 1 and 3 indicate a
substantial increase in the likelihood that a decision is made at the committee
level when the dossier proposes the establishment of a Comitology
committee. Models 2 and 4 reproduce this result with the alternative measure
of uncertainty indicating whether a proposal concerns one or several policy
areas, respectively. The salience of the dossier also seems to be of importance
for determining at which Council level a dossier is decided. The variable
measuring the salience of a dossier demonstrates a strong negative and
statistically significant relationship with the dependent variable.
In order to control for any unaccounted effects specific to policy-making
in certain Council formations, models 3 and 4 include dummy variables for
the different formations. The Employment and Social Affairs formation was
merged with the Health formation because of the small number of proposals
debated in the latter. All eight Health proposals were in fact discussed by
ministers. A dummy variable for the Health Council formation would have
completely determined the value of the dependent variable and resulted in
an exclusion of these observations from the statistical analysis.
The results of the significance tests indicate that a decision is more likely
to be made at the committee level in the areas of Economic and Finance,
Justice and Home Affairs, and Internal Market, Consumers and Tourism.
However, these tests have to be interpreted with care. The statistical signifi-
cance of all Council formation dummy variables depends crucially on the
chosen reference category. Given its relatively moderate position, Industry
and Research was used as the reference formation in the models presented in
Table 5. However, the coefficients of other Council formation variables may
be statistically significant when compared with a different reference category.
In this respect, the relative sizes of the coefficients of the Council formation
dummy variables are more informative than their statistical significance. The
Council formations of Environment, Transport and Telecommunications, and
Health, Employment and Social Affairs stand out for having relatively few
decisions made at the committee level when considering also the sizes and
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Table 4 Determinants of committee decision-making: Logistic regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Preference divergence –0.19 –0.17 0.49 0.49
(1.51) (1.36) (1.36) (1.32)
Qualified majority voting 0.43 0.39 1.52*** 1.59***
(1.15) (1.02) (2.81) (2.91)
EP involvement –0.84*** –0.95*** –1.07** –1.18***
(2.66) (2.95) (2.47) (2.62)
Committee meeting density –0.17*** –0.19*** 0.25 0.24
(2.91) (3.21) (1.26) (1.20)
Uncertainty 
Comitology committee 0.51* 0.60*
(1.89) (1.95)
Policy areas 0.71*** 0.97***
(2.69) (3.20)
Salience –0.20*** –0.18*** –0.21*** –0.20***














Justice and Home Affairs 2.57*** 3.14***
(2.68) (3.21)




Internal Market, Consumers, and 2.58*** 2.78***
Tourism (2.76) (2.94)
Health, Employment and –1.27 –1.16
Social Affairs (0.88) (0.78)
Constant 2.62*** 2.44*** –1.96 –2.56*
(4.80) (4.38) (1.48) (1.90)
Likelihood ratio Chi-squared 161.38*** 165.26*** 226.81*** 233.73***
Pseudo R2 .28 .28 .39 .40
Adj. Count R2 .42 .37 .53 .49
BIC –2209.67 –2213.55 –2208.17 –2215.09
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, 
*** significant at 1%, two-sided tests, N = 439. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable
indicating whether the dossier was only discussed on the committee level (1) or also by ministers (0).
signs of the coefficients. The differences in committee decision-making
between at least some of the Council formations and the substantial increase
in the overall fit of the models when Council formation controls are included
indicate that further unobserved factors connected to characteristics of
Council formations influence committee decision-making. Thus, the inclusion
of these control variables seems warranted.
Table 5 illustrates the substantial effects of the statistically significant
estimation results. The table is based on the best-fitting model specification
(model 4), which includes the variable indicating the number of policy areas
affected as a measure of uncertainty as well as Council formation indicators
as control variables. The table presents the changes in the probability that a
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Table 5 Effects of changes in the explanatory variables on the probability that a
decision is made at the committee level
Council formation
—————————————————————————–
Justice and Internal 
Agriculture Environment Home Affairs Market
Changes in predicted 
probabilities
Qualified majority voting .379 .119 .340 .366
EP involvement –.285 –.218 –.259 –.230
Uncertainty .168 .090 .230 .239
Salience –.810 –.625 –.829 –.871
Variable settings
Preference divergence 5.09 3.55 2.75 2.33
Qualified majority voting Yes Yes No Yes
EP involvement No Yes No Yes
Committee meeting density 1.23 9.95 1.87 0.84
Uncertainty No Yes No Yes
Salience 7 14 12 12.5
Notes: The cell entries in the upper part of the table give the change (i.e. the first difference) in the
predicted probability that a decision is made by a committee as a result of a change in an
independent variable. The figures are calculated based on model 4 in Table 4. In the case of
salience, the independent variable changes from 3 (5th percentile) to 30 (95th percentile) recitals.
All other variables are dichotomous and change from the absence to the presence of the
measured characteristic. Effects are given for different combinations of proposal characteristics
that are typical for four Council formations. The continuous variables are set to their median
values and the dichotomous variables to the value that is more common in a Council formation to
generate ‘typical’ proposals. The Council formation dummy variables are all set to zero, except for
the dummy variable concerning the formation for which the effects are calculated. The lower part
of the table gives details on the precise values the other variables are set to when the effect of
one of the independent variables is calculated.
decision is made at the committee level resulting from a change in the value
of an independent variable, keeping other independent variables constant at
a specified value. The table shows the effects of qualified majority voting, EP
involvement, uncertainty and salience given four different combinations of
values of the independent variables. The precise values are given in the lower
part of the table. Each of these combinations of values of the independent
variables corresponds to proposal features that are characteristic of a particu-
lar Council formation. Four formations were selected to cover a wide range
of values of the independent variables: Agriculture, Environment, Justice and
Home Affairs, and Internal Market, Consumers and Tourism. These four
formations also represent some of the busiest EU policy areas as far as
legislative decision-making is concerned (see Table 1).
In order to generate proposals that are ‘typical’ of a certain Council for-
mation, continuous independent variables are set to their Council formation
specific median values and dichotomous independent variables are set to the
value that is more frequently observed in proposals of the Council formation.
The dummy variables for different Council formations are all set to zero,
except for the dummy variable that indicates the formation for which the
effect is calculated. For example, the typical Agriculture dossier is character-
ized by a relatively strong preference divergence, a rather low number of
monthly committee meetings, a very moderate degree of salience, qualified
majority voting, no involvement of the EP, and no uncertainty surrounding
the consequences of the dossier in question. Given these default values for
the independent variables, the upper half of Table 5 indicates that a counter-
factual change from unanimity to qualified majority voting increases the
predicted probability that a decision is made by a committee by .38. In
contrast, a change from no EP involvement to involvement of the EP results
in a decrease of .29. Adding uncertainty increases the predicted probability
of a committee decision by .17, whereas an increase in the salience variable
from 3 (5th percentile) to 30 recitals (95th percentile) decreases the prob-
ability of a committee decision by .81.
Table 5 indicates a relatively consistent pattern regarding the effect sizes
of different variables. Salience is the most important predictor of committee
decision-making, followed by the voting rule, EP involvement and un-
certainty. All expected effects are of substantial size. Even the smallest effect
leads to a change in the predicted probability of a committee decision of .09.
Summary and conclusion
Committees play an important role in the decision-making process of the
Council of the European Union. Much of the legislation adopted by the
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Council is never discussed by ministers but is de facto decided by member
state officials in working parties and the Committee of Permanent Repre-
sentatives. Although the relevance of committees in Council decision-making
is often acknowledged (Westlake and Galloway, 2004: 202), little empirical
research has been devoted to the topic. As a contribution to remedy this situ-
ation, the study investigated the conditions under which legislative decisions
are made at the committee level of the Council hierarchy. Partly based on
existing research, several theoretical perspectives on committee decision-
making in the Council were identified and used to guide the empirical
analysis. An original data set of 439 legislative dossiers dealing with 
different policy matters formed the basis for the statistical enquiry.
The analysis yielded mixed results. Two of the theoretical arguments were
not supported by the empirical findings. The analysis gives no support to the
notion that committee socialization has an influence on whether or not a
decision is made at the committee level in the Council. The rejection of the
committee socialization hypothesis does not necessarily mean that committee
members do not share supranational norms and values or negotiate in a
reciprocal and cooperative manner. But the rejection of the hypothesis does
indicate that such cooperative negotiating behaviour is not a result of social-
ization in EU committees. In this respect, the finding is consistent with other
recent research indicating that the socializing effects of international insti-
tutions are at best weak (Beyers, 2005; Hooghe, 2005).
The results also indicate that preference divergence among member states
does not influence the level at which a decision is reached in the Council. This
finding is somewhat surprising, given that only proposals on which no agree-
ment can be found at lower levels in the Council hierarchy are discussed by
ministers. Together with the large effect of salience identified in the analysis,
this result might indicate that the importance attached to an issue by member
states is of more relevance for explaining the internal working of the Council
than the member states’ positions on the issue.
In accordance with expectations, the findings indicate that the involve-
ment of the EP in the co-decision procedure makes concluding negotiations at
the committee level more difficult. Essentially, the co-decision procedure adds
a further negotiation partner with veto power. The views of the EP have to be
taken into account by member states in order to pass legislation. Committee
negotiations are affected when the Council and the EP attempt to reach an
early agreement among the two institutions in the first reading of the co-
decision procedure, or, more indirectly, when member state representatives
take account of the future effects of the EP position on the outcome of inter-
institutional negotiations while deciding on a common position of the Council.
Although the size of the voting rule effect depends on the inclusion of
controls for different Council formations, the possibility of qualified majority
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voting seems to increase the probability of a decision being made at the
committee level. Existing accounts of Council decision-making give few
indications that the voting rule is explicitly applied to reach decisions at 
the committee level, but the mere prospect of a vote being taken at the
ministerial level seems to foster more compromising attitudes in committee
negotiations. The expected effect of uncertainty about the consequences of
legislative proposals is also found in the analysis. If a dossier demands more
specialized knowledge to understand its consequences, the dossier is more
likely to be decided at the committee level. Finally, the single most powerful
predictor of committee decision-making is the salience of a dossier. Ministers
can devote only a limited amount of time to Council decision-making. Thus,
ministers focus their attention on the most consequential proposals and leave
less important dossiers for bureaucrats to decide.
The results of the study yield a rather favourable picture regarding the
democratic legitimacy of Council decision-making.9 Although a considerable
proportion of legislative decisions is indeed made by diplomats and national
officials, the study finds no evidence that supports the view of government
representatives ‘going native’ in Brussels as a result of participating in
committee negotiations. In addition, few commentators would argue against
the merits of experts deciding on proposals that demand a good understand-
ing of highly complex matters. Ministers have time constraints and cannot
deal with each and every proposal personally. But the analysis demonstrates
that the most important dossiers do not go through the Council machinery
without the direct involvement of ministers. Thus, government ministers
seem to be more in control of Council decision-making than is frequently
suggested.
Notes
I thank Michael Kaeding, Gerald Schneider, Bernard Steunenberg, Dimiter
Toshkov, three anonymous referees and the panel participants at the conference
of the ECPR Standing Group on EU Politics in Istanbul, the annual conference of
UACES in Limerick, and the annual work conference of the NIG in Amsterdam,
all held in 2006, for valuable comments and suggestions.
1 Important exceptions include the studies by Beyers and Dierickx (1997, 1998),
which investigate the communication behaviour of working party members
through quantitative network analyses, and the qualitative case studies of
decision-making in the Committee of Permanent Representatives conducted
by Lewis (1998, 2003, 2005).
2 For more details on the results of these tests, see the contributions to the
special issue ‘Winners and Losers of EU Decision Making’, vol. 5, issue 1, of
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European Union Politics (2004) and Thomson et al. (2006). The models of König
and Proksch (2006a, 2006b) also incorporate a role for the Council’s
committees in determining the outcome of Council decision-making.
However, these models do not yield predictions about the conditions under
which agreement will be reached at the committee level.
3 See the ‘List of Council Preparatory Bodies’, Council document 8605/06. The
number includes senior committees (under heading A) but no sub-groups.
4 Only one of the proposals in the sample that had not been discussed by
ministers in the first reading was discussed by ministers in later stages of the
co-decision procedure. Thus, in practical terms, the focus on first-reading
decisions has no substantial effect on the dependent variable or the results
of the statistical analysis.
5 The coding procedure is likely to yield figures that exaggerate the influence
of ministers. An alternative, relatively reliable procedure codes cases as
committee decisions when the committee made the final decision before the
dossier was formally adopted. However, this alternative procedure is likely
to yield results that overstate the influence of committees. In addition, what
exactly a final decision entails in terms of committee influence is often not
clear. The types of decision reached by committees after ministerial
discussions can range from agreements on substantially important, still
outstanding issues to mere finalizations of the precise wording of compro-
mises essentially reached by ministers. In contrast, the coding of cases with
no direct ministerial involvement as instances of committee decisions results
in values that have a clear meaning and one that is comparable across 
cases.
6 Because the theoretical argument presumes a direct causal chain between the
amount of time spent on committee work, bureaucrats’ values and norms,
and the type of behaviour bureaucrats consider to be appropriate in
committee negotiations, no data on the attitudes of individual bureaucrats
are needed to examine this hypothesis.
7 An Excel macro was written in Visual Basic for Applications to extract the
raw information automatically. The programme downloads each website
contained in the database, searches for the relevant information and copies
the information to an Excel sheet. This Excel sheet is then converted to a Stata
file for further data processing and the statistical analysis.
8 In spatial modelling terms, the measure corresponds to the ‘core’. The core
consists of the set of policy alternatives that cannot be beaten by any other
alternative in a vote. Although intuitive and easily interpretable, a weakness
of the core as a concept of political conflict is its neglect of actors’ differential
power resources. Power resources are an important feature of bargaining
theories of Council decision-making. As an alternative measure of political
conflict, the Sigelman and Yough (1978) measure of polarization was calcu-
lated, using voting weights of member states as a proxy for bargaining power.
The polarization indicator is highly correlated to the core and the results of
the analysis are almost identical. The analysis was also repeated using the
qualified majority core in cases where qualified majority voting applies,
yielding no substantial changes in the results. Finally, all of these measures
were recalculated using the government coalition mean rather than the
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position of the responsible minister as the position of a member state. The
results of these analyses are also not substantially different from the results
using the minister core variable.
9 As one of the reviewers pointed out, the democratic legitimacy of bureau-
crats making any legislative decisions at all can be questioned. Although not
impossible, changing this practice would require far-reaching modifications
of the way in which legislative decision-making is organized in the Council
and possibly in the EU in general. The following remarks refer to the demo-
cratic legitimacy of Council decision-making given the current institutional
structure of the EU. The comments are also restricted to an evaluation of the
legitimacy of the process leading up to legislative decisions by the Council.
Further legitimacy issues may arise when the implementation of EU legis-
lation in member states is also considered (e.g. König, 2007).
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